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### Case

#### DOE already committed to fixing regulatory barriers

Colman 10/1 (Zack Colman, “Nuke industry presses for change to proliferation rules,” The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/259529-nuclear-group-says-doe-rule-change-would-create-jobs)

A nuclear energy industry group is lobbying the Energy Department (DOE) to eliminate a trade barrier that it says would help U.S. firms add jobs.¶ Specifically, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) says DOE should change a rule, known as Part 810, to enhance exports to a list of restricted nations for products — such as consulting services and software — that it says do not pose a nuclear proliferation threat.¶ The rule change would allow U.S. commercial nuclear firms to discuss operations with foreign partners more freely, according to NEI.¶ The group said the rule change would remove a competitive disadvantage for U.S. firms in the global market.¶ Currently, the rule requires U.S. companies to obtain advance authorization to speak about nuclear plans with a list of restricted countries, out of concern for nuclear proliferation. On average in 2011, that clearance took a little less than one year, according to a NEI-commissioned report discussed Monday.¶ DOE issued a proposed update to the rule in September 2011, but that significantly increased the amount of technology subjected to agency authorization. The nuclear industry criticized the rule, and DOE decided to revise it once again — a process that is still ongoing.¶ At issue is whether DOE has the authority to make the changes the nuclear industry seeks.¶ The Atomic Energy Act created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and gave it the power to approve nuclear export licenses for things such as nuclear fuel. It is unclear whether that authority extends to consulting services and software, though the nuclear industry believes it does not.¶ “The administrative agencies, particularly DOE, have the latitude to be able to administer these regulations in a much more efficient way,” Richard Myers, NEI vice president for policy development, said at a Monday press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.¶ NEI said the nation’s regulatory regime handcuffs it from securing a share of a global commercial nuclear market that Commerce estimates could range from $500 billion to $750 billion over the next decade. NEI said capturing a quarter of that market would yield 185,000 U.S. jobs.¶ The report, which was conducted by Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, said U.S. commercial nuclear export regulations are more complex than those from Korea, France, Japan and Russia. Much of that is attributed to at least four federal agencies — the departments of Commerce, Energy and State, as well as the NRC — having a hand in that oversight.¶ Waiting for authorization to discuss operational details with foreign partners has proven burdensome for Exelon Generation, J. Bradley Fewell, the utility’s vice president and deputy general counsel, said Monday.¶ “These regulations are hampering our ability to expand the sale of and implementation of our nuclear management model,” he said.¶ DOE said it is reviewing public comments on Part 810.¶ "We are committed to an approach that balances the needs of industry and our goals for nuclear energy with our responsibility to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and keep dangerous nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists. The Administration continues to review 810 rules and will proceed in a way that incorporates the feedback that we've received to date," Joshua McConaha, a spokesman with DOE's National Nuclear Safety Administration, said in a statement.

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#### Reps reflect material reality

Mearsheimer 1995 John Mearsheimer (International Relations professor at the University of Chicago) 1995 The False Promise of International Institutions in International Security Vol 19 Number 3 Winter, pp 43-44.

The main goal of critical theorists is to change state behavior in fundamental ways, to move beyond a world of security competition and war and establish a pluralistic security community. However, their explanation of how change occurs is at best incomplete, and at worst, internally contradictory.155 Critical theory maintains that state behavior changes when discourse changes. But that argument leaves open the obvious and crucially important question: what determines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses? This general question, in turn, leads to three more specific questions: 1) Why has realism been the hegemonic discourse in world politics for so long? 2) Why is the time ripe for its unseating? 3) Why is realism likely to be replaced by a more peaceful communitarian discourse? Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas Risse- Kappen writes, "Research on. . . 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transna- tional networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selfected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside." 156 Not surprisingly, critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory. Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power." Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society;" like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] de- prived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?" 157 Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "Some of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the chal- lenges of global politics today."158 It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study inter- national politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging.159 There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory, according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act ... such expectations are almost never realized in practice."

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2000 Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

#### Extinction outweighs – as long as there is some life there’s only a risk they retain ontological capacity

Jonas 1996 Hans Jonas (Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich) 1996 “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

#### Realism is inevitable – you’re alt cant change it

Guzzini 1998 Stefano Guzzini, Assis. Prof @ Central European U, Realism in Int’l Relations, 1998, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

#### Calls to address specific security threats are key to solve those problems without succumbing to the pratfalls of the Bush Doctrine

Nicholson and Schaffer 2011 Kailyn Nicholson and Anna Schaffer - Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies - 3/10/2011, The Future of U.S. Democracy Promotion: Strategies for a Sustainable Fourth Wave of Democratization, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/16487/Task%20Force%20C%202011%20Web.pdf?sequence=1

Democracy Promotion in Rhetoric The current administration has attempted to steer clear of unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic doctrine. This resolution appears to reflect the Obama administration‘s efforts to disassociate from the Bush-era rhetoric that provoked such global criticism. Post 9/11, the Bush administration was seen to sway between a preemptive realism that sought to unilaterally maintain America‘s position of power in the world and a lofty Wilsonian rhetoric that espoused spreading democratic ideals to all corners of the globe. Especially under Bush‘s Freedom Agenda, supporting democracy and the promotion of freedom was embraced as a foreign policy goal. The Freedom Agenda incorporated or helped to justify the global war on terror and Iraqi invasion. Increasingly weak evidence to support initial justifications for intervention eventually gave way to the language of democracy promotion as a more appealing rhetoric. And, Iraq became the centerpiece of this agenda executed in the name of promoting democratic values and supporting human rights. In his second inaugural address in 2005, former President Bush stated, So it is the policy of the U.S. to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world…We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require decent treatment of their own people. America‘s belief in human dignity will guide our principles (Bush 2005) In claiming that the long-term goal of the U.S. was to end ‗tyranny in our world,‘ Bush set unrealistic and idealized expectations for the results of democracy promotion. Much of the justifications by the Bush administration for democracy promotion asserted the moral grounds for democracy. In a speech at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh Egypt, former President Bush pronounced: Some say any state that holds an election is a democracy. But true democracy requires vigorous political parties allowed to engage in free and lively debate. True democracy requires the establishment of civic institutions that ensure an election‘s legitimacy and hold leaders accountable. And true democracy requires competitive elections in which opposition candidates are allowed to campaign without fear or intimidation. Too often in the Middle East, politics has consisted of one leader and the opposition in jail. America is deeply concerned about the plight of political prisoners in this region, as well as democratic activists who are intimidated or repressed, newspapers and civil society organizations that are shut down, and dissidents whose voices are stifled. The time has come for nations across the Middle East to abandon these practices, and treat their people with dignity and the respect they deserve (Bush 2008) Here, former President Bush professed to stand behind democratic forces in all states. The fact that this speech took place three years after the 2005 Egyptian presidential election, where one candidate, Ayman Nour, was imprisoned, highlights a thread of hypocrisy in Bush‘s lofty rhetoric. Alternatively, the Obama administration adopted a more realistic rhetoric that gave recognition to other national interests, including security interests and threats to U.S. security. In response to the discourse and policies of the previous administration President Obama stated: Indeed, one of the lessons of our effort in Iraq is that American influence around the world is not a function of military force alone. We must use all elements of our power -- including our diplomacy, our economic strength, and the power of America's example -- to secure our interests and stand by our allies. And we must project a vision of the future that's based not just on our fears, but also on our hopes -- a vision that recognizes the real dangers that exist around the world (Obama 2010) Indeed, Obama‘s rhetoric implies a much more pragmatic approach than that of the previous administration. Here, Obama stated the need for balancing various U.S. interests and real-world threats, while also acknowledging tensions. One critique of Obama states, ―If there is an Obama doctrine emerging, it is one much more realpolitik than his predecessor‘s, focused on relations with traditional great powers and relegating issues like human rights and democracy to second-tier concerns‖ (Baker 2010). However, it should be noted and taken into consideration that pragmatic responses advocated by the Obama administration may have been influenced by the legacy issues left from the previous administration. It is possible the Obama administration has taken a realistic and pragmatic approach because it is an alternative to the last administration. Therefore, it is important to consider how foreign policy is influenced by legacy and also how it may be constrained by reality. In any case, within any administration, Wilsonian ideals and moral values are never to be ignored. In his most recent State of the Union address Obama gave support to human rights and noted: Recent events have shown us that what sets us apart must not just be our power – it must also be the purpose behind it. In south Sudan – with our assistance – the people were finally able to vote for independence after years of war….And we saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: The U.S. of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people (Obama 2011) While Obama does still express support for human rights and democratic values he does so with an air of caution. Unlike the previous administration, this administration refrains from soaring unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic and realistic rhetoric regarding foreign policy and democracy promotion. In doing so, this current administration is seen to be noticeably less hypocritical and inconsistent than the previous. C. Implementation: Rhetoric in Action? In reality U.S. democracy promotion efforts have not reflected the rhetoric surrounding it. Democracy promotion is inconsistent country to country and policy to policy. Actions do not reflect the language expressed by policy makers to support democracy. After the Bush administration it has become increasingly entangled with military interests resulting in the association of democracy promotion with regime change and forceful coercion. Under the façade of democracy promotion, policies may implement a top-down effort supporting supposed democratic leaders rather than fostering democratic values from the bottom-up through civil society. Its exclusiveness and selectiveness is seen when we support democracy in one state and ignore human rights in another. Within the Bush administration a large gap existed between talk and action whether it was the continued cozy relations with the Saudi government, the U.S. embrace of Pakistan‘s former military dictator Pervez Musharraf, or the largely uncritical line toward China‘s continued authoritarianism (Carothers 2007). In the Middle East, the Bush administration later came to characterize its interventionin Iraq as a democratizing mission, when clearly other interests, particularly security interests were involved from the start. Other U.S. autocratic allies in the region felt almost no pressure at all, despite the Bush team‘s grand pronouncements about its commitment to a politically transformed region (Carothers 2007). Instead, the Bush administration worked to tighten relations with allies in the region in an effort to create a friendly coalition of states that would serve as useful partners in the War on Terror and would help to maintain the balance of power as it was in the Middle East. Thus, the statement of principles made by President Bush at the World Economic Forum in Egypt in 2008 rarely applies to Egypt or other U.S. allies in the Middle East. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Ethiopia have all escaped the rhetoric of supporting human rights and democratic values by the Bush administration(Carothers 2007). Indeed, inconsistency between rhetoric and action is widespread; however, inconsistency in rhetoric between private and public audiences also exists. This is a different situation where the U.S. presents public rhetoric of support, for example, in the case of Egypt -prior to the year 2011- but expresses disapproval and criticisms in private. The recent release of WikiLeaks documents has revealed how American diplomats have repeatedly raised concerns with Egyptian officials about jailed dissidents and bloggers. A 2009 cable from U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, highlighted the difficulty of promoting democracy in a state that is both a strategic ally, but also a partial democracy ruled by an oppressive president: We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE [Government of Egypt] remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, complaining that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament (Embassy Cairo. 2009) However, the documents also show that relations between Mubarak and Obama warmed up as a result of Obama playing down what was the so-called ‗name and shame‘ approach of the Bush Administration (Landler and Lehren 2011). The nature of the WikiLeaks documents concerning Egypt draw attention to a balancing of private pressure with strong public support for Mubarak under the current administration-underscoring yet another sign of inconsistency. II. How False U.S. Rhetoric Has Hurt U.S. Reputation and Image While the U.S. has unparalleled economic and military assets, American influence and standing in the world are significantly low. Frequent gaps between rhetoric and behavior, policy changes or even reversals have harmed the U.S. image as an international power and moral figure. This negative image is partially a consequence of false rhetoric. A recent committee on human rights in Washington acknowledged, ―The world is not blind to this double standard. When they see the U.S. promoting human rights, not as a matter of principle but as a matter of convenience, it saps these principles of much of their force, and it makes the U.S. a much less powerful moral force on behalf of the values that this Nation stands for‖ (U.S. 2008). Even among other Western nations, the U.S. is seen to have a weak stance concerning human rights. In 1998, The United States Information Agency (USIA) found that 59 percent of the British and 61 percent of Germans said the U.S. was doing a good job promoting human rights. Today, 56 percent of the British and 78 percent of Germans say the US is doing a bad job (Kull 2007). Clearly, opinions of the U.S. on human rights issues have degraded significantly. An American rhetoric supporting human rights and democratic ideals worldwide while, simultaneously, failing to be consistent in implementing this rhetoric evidently will influence this degradation. The U.S. is viewed as hypocritical in its rhetoric about human rights and democracy because it is seen to be selective in its actual application. American leaders pursue more confrontational strategies for supporting democratic change against those countries with strained relations with the U.S. and adopt policies of engagement to induce or, at times, overlook democratic change with allies and friends. ―Close American relationships with authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and cordial relationships with autocratic rulers in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Equatorial Guinea, undermine U.S. credibility when criticizing similar types of autocratic regimes with less friendly ties to Washington‖ (McFaul 2010,163). Rhetoric about liberty has been juxtaposed with the instability in Iraq and democracy promotion has become associated with regime change. In the past decade, ―the rhetorical conflation by the Bush Administration and its allies of the war in Iraq and democracy promotion has muddied the meaning of the democracy project, diminishing support for it at home and abroad‖ (Melia 2007, 12). Public opinion polls from a 2005 survey by the Pew Research Center found the U.S. to be broadly disliked in most countries surveyed. Furthermore, a degrading trend in U.S. image can be seen as a repercussion of the inconsistency in rhetoric and policy of the past. A poll, conducted for BBC World Service in 18 countries, tracked this issue from 2005-2007. ―On average, positive views of the U.S. have slipped from 40 percent in 2005 to 36 percent in 2006 to 29 percent in 2007. Negative views have risen from 46 percent in 2005 to 52 percent in 2007‖ (Kull 2007). What‘s more, Gallup Polls in 143 countries reveal the image of the leadership of the U.S. is generally poor worldwide, but that the Obama administration will have the most repair work to do on its image in the predominantly Muslim Middle East and North Africa, where regional median approval is just 15 percent (Ray 2009). One year into his term, global opinion polls taken by Gallup reflect a positive view of Obama‘s leadership and foreign policy, yet, still present mixed reviews towards his handlings of trouble spots in the Middle East (English 2010). Such negative views of the U.S. erode U.S. power and undermine U.S. influence abroad. III. Democracy Promotion as a Façade for Promoting Other U.S. Interests The point where democracy promotion rhetoric does not properly align with implementation of supporting democracy, in any given state, is a sign of inconsistency and the use of democracy promotion as a façade for promoting other U.S. interests. Inconsistency between rhetoric and action in democracy promotion highlights the varying and diverse interests of the U.S. where democracy promotion, at times, wrongly serves the purpose of justifying other non-related and sometimes contrary U.S. interests. While the U.S. does wish to support and uphold human rights and the universal concept of economic, social and political freedoms, these interests somehow fall behind other US interests. This raises the questions of: whether U.S. interests are presented as prioritized? And how does one account for the supremacy of security interests over values of supporting human rights and democracy in general? This section will first examine U.S. interests from a Wilsonian, idealist view and next, from a realist view. These two schools of thought concerning foreign policy and inevitably, democracy promotion are today seen to be in opposition with each other. This can be accounted for by the short-term mindset of foreign policy in any given administration. Foreign policy is bound to vary with each new administration, within the same administration or due to a change in the global landscape. A forward-looking foreign policy strategy encourages a balance between interests of supporting human rights and moral values (so called idealist interests), and realist tendencies to focus solely on security and strategic interests. The current strategy, however, juxtaposes these two interest views and prompts a choice between the two. Thus, while it is in U.S. interests in the long-term to promote democracy as an end in itself, U.S. actions concerning democracy promotion currently seem to be motivated and driven by short-term interests. This section will analyze where focus on short-term realist interests has prompted a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. In this manner, democracy promotion is used as a tool, rather than an end, to maintain or secure other strategic interests. What‘s more, efforts to advance democracy and human rights only occur when they are in agreement with other interests. Shortterm realist interests also reveal, in certain cases, that democracy promotion does not even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting democracy. China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Russia, are sites where security and economic interests override the interest of supporting a democracy (Carothers 2007). Furthermore, lack of clarity and consistency in policies has wrongly entangled democracy promotion with military and security interests. Security, for any state, including the U.S. is critical to a state‘s survival. Indeed, first and foremost, security is America‘s primary interest. Michael McFaul notes that the ―central purpose of American power is not to make the world a better place, but first to ensure security, prosperity of American people‖ and the ―paramount objective of American foreign policy must always be to defend the security of the American people‖ (McFaul 2010, 10, 68). Deterring military foes, forging alliances, creating alliances, ensuring stable access to natural resources, creating and maintaining U.S. military bases, expanding trade and investment opportunities abroad all represent strategies to ensure American security and, therefore, generally precede other policies (United States 2010). However, security is not, nor should not, be the sole interest of U.S foreign policy. Foreign policy, must take other interests into account; clearly, ―Not all interests need to be vital to be worthy of American protection‖ (Haass 1995, 48). A. The Case for Wilsonianism A Wilsonian view of foreign policy and also democracy promotion states a U.S. interest in upholding moral values. The U.S. has a moral obligation to human rights, and here democracy promotion is not simply a tool for national interest. Democracy promotion is seen as an end in itself that promotes human rights values, quality of life, economic, political and social liberties. In rhetoric, America‘s stated interests for promoting democracy are normally Wilsonian ideals associated with supporting human empowerment and self-determination and the wish that democratic values are shared globally. Critics have deemed this view to be limited in the scope with which it can substantiate a policy action to promote democracy. Richard Haassargues, ―The principal problem with this thinking is that the active promotion of democracy is a luxury policymakers cannot always afford‖ (Haass 1995, 46). Further critiques note that there may still be instances where national security or economic interests override supporting democratic values. When it comes to human rights, nowhere have the conflicts and contradictions been greater than in Washington‘s dealings with superpowers. Haass continues, ―When it comes to relations with Russia or China, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, other national security interests must normally take precedence over (or at least coexist with) concerns about how they choose to govern themselves. During the early Bush administration certain neo-conservatives appropriated ―the fact that promoting democracy can be difficult and expensive also reduces its attraction as a foreign policy compass‖ as another means to highlight the apparent conflicting interests associated with democracy promotion (Haass 2005). B. The Case for Realism Realists emphasize the balance of U.S. power amongst other global actors through the maintenance of security. ―This theory prescribes that the U.S. has a security interest in increasing its military and economic power and fostering and maintaining alliances with powerful states to check the influence of other great or rising powers‖(McFaul 2010, 76). Above all else, maintaining a balance of power is ideal. U.S. needs access to oil, minerals, basing rights and trade from all countries willing to cooperate, irrespective of whether they are autocratic or democratic. Realists argue that democracy promotion can undermine allies, empower anti-American forces and generate both domestic and international instability. In the case of Egypt, for instance, supporters of Mubarak and Mubarak himself, argued that democratization could give way to the empowerment of non-western friendly actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately destabilize the Middle East region (Embassy Cairo 2010).Haass acknowledges ―The strength of the realist approach is that it does not overlook existing and potential threats to U.S. interests, threats that if they were to materialize could overwhelm policy concerns‖ (Haass 1995, 48). C. Democracy Promotion as a Tool, Rather Than an End Here is where focus on short-term realist interests prompts a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. Under a realist school of thought, democracy promotion is seen as a tool rather than an end. It can be emphasized as a strategy to ideally secure other interests. Consequently, democracy promotion, when it exists, can become entangled with military and security interests; or, democracy promotion may not exist at all where other strategic interests are already present. Still, there are cases where democracy promotion doesn‘t even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting a democracy. U.S. military presence in the Middle East prompts the need for allies in the region. Pakistan represents one instance; Pervez Musharraf maintained control of Pakistan with his power as a military dictator up until the 2008 elections. Security interests as well as economic interests play a significant role in undermining democracy promotion in the Middle East. U.S. oil interests invoke a more hardheaded foreign policy that disregards human rights and quality of life standards in states such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Michael McFaul notes, ―Without the illiberal kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a trade partner today, the U.S. would not have enough affordable energy to support our current way of life‖ (McFaul 2010, 79). On the same note, other countries with limited trade and aid relations to the U.S., such as Syria, will not experience the same policy with the U.S. as does Saudi Arabia, for instance. Economic and strategic interests have, in the past, prevented the U.S. from taking a firm stance against China‘s human rights violations. China, on the contrary, maintains a favored nation status. For the U.S., ―promoting human rights was jettisoned in May 1994 when the need to export to China and engage in a host of strategic efforts proved too significant to set aside‖ (Haass 1995, 53). Indeed U.S. leverage against China‘s human rights violations is supposedly limited due to economic interests that are present. Furthermore, when powers face a challenger to their hegemony, they are more likely to tolerate autocracies that can present themselves as buffer against their rivals (Levitsky and Steven and Way, 2002). The U.S. has been cited for supporting the ‗democrat‘ rather than the democracy where support for autocratic allies is emphasized over support for actual democratic institutions. This policy was seen in Egypt, prior to January 25, 2011, where the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in aid over the past several decades to prop up the Egyptian dictatorship. Supporters of this policy acknowledge the false assumption that elected parties will be in agreement with the U.S. and its foreign policy. They acknowledge that democratic elections could promote the rise of a fascist leader (Kopstein 2006, 89). Mubarak, has been cited frequently for human rights violations; detention, torture, refusal to register opposition political parties were all used by Mubarak as a means to constrain the scope of democracy and prevent a threat to his persistent rule (Untied States 2008). In Egypt, Mubarak profited from this Western concern that Islamists will win a fair election in the country. ―As evidence Mubarak can point to the parliamentary elections of 2005, when candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood captured a majority of the seats they contested‖ (United States 2008). Although the U.S. rarely placed pressure on Mubarak publicly, documents from WikiLeaks reveal U.S. pressure on Mubarak to democratize and to improve human rights. Nevertheless, ―U.S. pressure for democratization largely ended with the strong Muslim Brotherhood showing of 2005‖(United States 2008). Instances of supporting autocratic allies have happened frequently in U.S. foreign policy, and present a challenge to the consistency in rhetoric of foreign policy and democracy promotion in the future. D. Entanglement of Democracy Promotion with Military or Security Interests Inconsistency between rhetoric and action can also manifest itself when other U.S. interests, specifically military and security interests, become entangled with the act of promoting democracy. In the past decade, entanglement represents one of the greatest faults to American foreign policy and its association with democracy promotion consequently. Entanglement presented itself most distinctly within Bush‘s Freedom Agenda where military force became an instrument for democracy promotion and democracy promotion became associated with regime change. Here, McFaul comments that “During the Bush administration, the American armed forces assumed a leading role in fostering democratic change (McFaul 2010, 155). At times, the purpose for a military intervention can be disguised under the veil of democracy promotion. Or, similarly, democracy promotion becomes a façade to fulfill other interests, as was seen in Iraq. “The increasingly threadbare nature of initial US justifications for the invasion, (weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq-Al-Qaeda ‘link‘), rendered the language of democracy promotion an attractive fall-back for the administration" (Durac and Cavatorta 2009, 9). A close association between military intervention and democracy promotion overshadows the more traditional and legitimate means for supporting democratic development in other countries. In Iraq, policy makers fell back on democracy when all other legitimate reasons to invade couldn‘t be summoned. In cases like this, the act of using democracy promotion as a façade renders U.S. democracy promotion misleading and unfounded. IV. Undermining U.S. Credibility and Image A. Accusations of Hypocrisy The determinedness with which the Bush administration tied democracy promotion rhetoric to aggressive War on Terror military actions had the opposite of its desired effect. The U.S. had hoped that its preemption policy might be more palatable if couched in values that are almost universally agreed upon, like freedom and democracy. President Bush‘s statement ―For the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and justice that have begun to transform the Middle East‖ implies that the U.S.‘s involvement in the Middle East is consistently aimed at supporting democratic movements. However, the fact that security is a much more immediate concern in military conflicts meant that, in practice, democracy was not the primary consideration when it came to which governments to support and which to challenge. Egypt, for example, is a close U.S. ally and enjoyed generous military support throughout the freedom agenda years despite being decisively authoritarian. On the other hand, the U.S. refused to support Hamas although it was democratically elected by the Palestinian people. While both of these decisions make sense from a geopolitical/security perspective, they do not fit the democracy promotion agenda. When President Bush made universal statements about democracy promotion while at the same time supporting non-democracies and failing to support all functioning democracies for security reasons, the international community recognized the hypocrisy. B. Accusations of Hubris Another way in which U.S. democracy promotion rhetoric helped undermine our credibility and image abroad has been by declaring success, or at least marked progress, in places where democracy, if it exists at all, is not functioning enough to improve the quality of life of citizens. By calling these examples successful, the U.S. either looks disturbingly out of touch or too haughty to admit the shortcomings of its democracy promotion efforts. Iraq is an excellent example of this, as Frank Rich of the New York Times points out: ―Iraq‘s ‗example of freedom,‘‖ as President Bush referred to his project in nation building and democracy promotion, did not inspire other states in the Middle East to emulate it. If Iraq is an example of success, who indeed would volunteer to be the next patient of U.S. democracy promotion? There are many other examples stretching back before the Bush era of similarly willfully inaccurate statements. Thomas Carothers points to the Congo, Cambodia, and Soviet-free Afghanistan as cases where the U.S. stubbornly congratulated themselves on progress that, to the rest of the world, looked like tragedy. Setting unrealistic expectations for the results of democracy promotion, such as President Bush‘s ―long-term goal of ending tyranny in our world, ―are another form of this hubris (Bush 2005). These two types of misleading rhetoric create a very stark image of U.S. democracy promotion in the eyes of the rest of the world. The U.S. claims to stand behind democratic forces in all states, but does not follow through when more immediate strategic concerns are present. Actions claimed to be democracy promotion are implemented with military coercion and claimed as successes even if they fail to provide security or stability for the country‘s citizens, and, in the case of Iraq, actively destabilize a region. As a result, ―the credibility of the US as an agent of democracy promotion in the Middle East is called into question, both within the region and without‖ (Bali and Rana, 2010). V. Implications for Diplomatic Effectiveness: Realism The preceding mistakes have resulted in ―Obama and his foreign-policy team edge[ing] away from the language of democracy promotion, which they fear that the Freedom Agenda has rendered toxic. (Taub 2009)‖ The new administration may feel the need to avoid Bush-era rhetoric that engendered so much criticism, but the associations of U.S. democracy promotion with aggressive militarism, hypocrisy, and arrogance will not disappear overnight. They must be replaced by a strong, realistic redefinition of what democracy promotion means to the U.S., when and how it will be practiced, and when it must take a backseat to other more immediate concerns. Once the U.S. rhetorically embraces realistic standards, it will be possible for policy and rhetoric to be consistent. This will present a reasonable face for U.S. democracy promotion, encouraging cooperation and discussion rather than avoidance or presumptive opposition. This is something U.S. policymakers should be concerned with for more substantive reasons than international popularity. Being seen as hypocritical and arrogant strengthens the case of foreign leaders seeking to oppose U.S. policy, both in international forums and bilateral relations. The U.S.‘s ability to achieve foreign policy objectives- be they economic, military, or geopolitical- is materially harmed by the perception that we have qualities undesirable in a working relationship. Unrealistic assessment of outcomes, inconsistency, unwillingness to recognize areas of weakness, and arrogance are all characteristics that do not invite support and cooperation. Indeed, McFaul asserts the Bush administration‘s rhetoric and policy in the Middle East were damaging to the U.S.‘s ability to realize foreign policy goals to the extent that they formed ―a serious impasse between the White House and all other international organizations, which subsequently tried to steer clear of associating with Bush policies, including his freedom agenda‖ (McFaul 2010, 218). It clearly follows that all U.S foreign policy goals are served by a positive and respected image abroad, because other states and international organizations are more willing to cooperate with policies when they have a positive image of U.S. goals and methods for achieving them. Certain aspects of democracy promotion have been identified as contributing to a negative image abroad:  Aggression/militarism  Unwarranted declarations of success/denial of mistakes  Inconsistency o Between rhetoric and action Between standards for various states Accordingly, attempts to foster a more positive, cooperative image should involve amending democracy promotion policy to be more:  Peaceful and non-coercive  Realistic o In assessments of progress and willingness to discuss/learn from mistakes o Rhetoric able to be achieved with action o Policies capable of being applied consistently across cases (flexible, humble) Incorporating these guidelines into a new coherent democracy promotion strategy will help the Obama administration avoid the backlash against Bush era mistakes. As previously mentioned Obama is already bringing his democracy promotion rhetoric down to a more realistic level, but he has not fully embraced all the changes necessary for a new effective era of democracy promotion. His administration‘s handling of the recent Egyptian protests is an indication of the need for clear, consistent rhetoric that can be employed in situations where democracy promotion and other interests conflict. This is already acknowledged in private. A cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt in 2008 admits that ―An ongoing challenge remains balancing our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts.‖ Yet instead of openly addressing this conflict in statements on Egypt‘s unfolding revolution, President Obama delivered ―ambiguous messages about an orderly transition‖ (Embassy Cairo 2008). More than two weeks into the protests, he issued a statement saying ―the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people‖ (Obama 2011). While this is certainly an improvement on former president Bush‘s coercive and idealistic rhetoric, it does not provide a clear policy on democracy promotion and its limitations. Inherent in the statement is a message of non-coercion, acknowledgement of the unpredictability of democratization efforts, and an unwillingness to burn bridges with current government authorities. All of these considerations should be stated publicly and result from a clearly defined U.S. policy on democracy promotion that commits to realistic goals and recognizes that other interests like regional security must play a role in immediate decisions without endangering the long-term process of democratization. A. Non-coercion: Separating Immediate Security Concerns from Democracy Promotion Efforts As later sections of this paper will discuss, successful democratization is a long-term process requiring diverse economic and civil society development. While it is possible to destabilize a dictatorial regime through military or economic coercion, removing one undemocratic government does not automatically- or even usually- usher a functioning democracy into power. Therefore coercion is rarely a useful tool in democracy promotion efforts. More frequently, as described earlier in the chapter, democracy promotion ends up being used as a justification for otherwise unpopular coercive actions. Iraq is the most recent and most blatant example of military coercion justified by democracy promotion rhetoric, but understood by most politicians to be a strategic attempt to gain influence in the oil-rich Middle East. Cuba provides an excellent example of economic coercion in the name of democracy. If the sanctions imposed by the U.S. really were an attempt to force a democratic transition, the decades of unperturbed socialism since their implementation would have proven this method a failure. The fact that the embargo remains intact proves other strategic interests are at stake. If the U.S. can refrain from using democracy promotion rhetoric to justify coercive policies, foreign governments and citizens will be less likely to balk at the idea of allowing the U.S. influence in their country. Later sections of this paper will elaborate on strategies for peaceful and non-coercive democracy promotion. This should be a policy that the U.S. is firmly committed to. Not only does it adhere to a basic moral commitment to human rights, peace, and stability, as outlined previously, by showing respect for state sovereignty and international cooperation it will also increase the ability of the U.S. to achieve foreign policy goals through diplomatic channels. Matthew Longo agrees that ―Without question, military power is important, but it is not the only road forward. Nor is it always the best agent for change. The message of democracy-promotion abroad is not well-delivered from the opposite end of a gun‖ (Longo 2010). This is not a call for the U.S. to withdraw its foreign military presence or adopt a pacifist attitude; far from it. It simply urges that democracy promotion rhetoric not be used as a decoration to make military action more palatable. Security rhetoric can be militant, but for the sake of effectiveness in the international arena, democracy promotion rhetoric should be non-coercive. B. Achievable Rhetoric The second point, realistic assessment of progress in democracy promotion efforts, is crucial in order to achieve consistency between rhetoric and action. If the government makes grandiose statements about democracy promotion, as were common under Bush‘s Freedom Agenda, it will be hard pressed to live up to them. Eliminating tyranny entirely is a noble goal, as is supporting all democratic movements worldwide, but the truth is that the U.S. government is in no position to actually do either of those things. It cannot achieve consistency between rhetoric and action if rhetoric is unrealistic. This is not to say that there is no place for lofty or inspiring language. On the contrary, it often plays an important role in motivating populations to organize for democratic change. What is essential is that lofty rhetoric not be confused with actual commitments to act or expected outcomes of an action. For example, instead of claiming a completely free and democratic Middle East to be the goal of a policy like the Freedom Agenda, U.S. politicians could state that all citizens of Middle Eastern states deserve to have their basic rights and freedoms protected by accountable, responsive governments. It is entirely possible to reinforce a commitment to human rights and quality of life for all people without making specific claims about the U.S.‘s own power to reshape the world as it sees fit. C. Realism Allows for Consistency In addition to rhetoric about goals and actions being realistic in scope, it must also be as consistent as possible with actual U.S. interests, policies, and actions. Clearly this is not possible in all areas of foreign policy, particularly security and intelligence, but for democracy promotion it is largely possible and in fact helpful in many ways. Cavatorta and Durac point out that often, ―rather than being interested in democratic reform for its own sake, the US propounds democracy in the hope and expectation that it will deliver outcomes which the US desires.‖ It is important not to confuse democracy promotion for its own sake with democracy promotion used as part of a strategy to make a state less hostile to U.S. interests, be they economic, military, or political. This distinction is important because, as previously stated, democracy promotion is a long-term and contextually sensitive project and is unlikely to succeed as part of a short-term effort to affect specific strategic variables. Thus, if democracy promotion is tied to such projects rhetorically, it will seem to have a low success rate and diminish our credibility. If, however, it is made clear that the U.S. is seeking a strategic outcome, for instance permission to build a military base in a foreign state, and democracy promotion is one of many tools being employed to towards this end, no unrealistic expectations are raised. In this case, the U.S. appears pragmatic rather than blindly optimistic. Being clear and realistic rhetorically about the desired short-term and long-term outcomes of policies will improve the image of the U.S. as an international actor and restore credibility to its democracy promotion efforts. When democracy promotion is indeed the priority of a given project, it will be more successful and contribute to a more admirable and diplomatically effective U.S. when mistakes are recognized, discussed in a cooperative forum, and amended for future projects. Democracy promotion, like any process, will stagnate if unsuccessful models are ignored and allowed to proliferate because of a desire to save face. It is time to stop ―using transitional language to characterize countries that in no way conform to any democratization paradigm‖ and earn back the respect of the democracy promotion community (Carothers 2007, 4). D. Realism Encourages Multilateral Cooperation A further benefit to realistic assessments of progress beyond image repair is the possibility for greater international cooperation on democracy promotion projects. Discussions among democracy promoters about the successes and challenges of particular cases will not only foster a sense of shared goals, but also allow for faster and more effective revisions of unsuccessful tactics. Multilateralism has many benefits that will be more thoroughly discussed later in the paper, but most simply it will make us less vulnerable to accusations of arrogance. Exemplifying the willingness to cooperate and take criticism that we would like to see in other states will only bolster our credibility and effectiveness in the diplomatic arena. VI. Conclusion Improving the image of the U.S. abroad will increase its effectiveness in all aspects of foreign policy. Creating a clear, consistent democracy promotion policy that recognizes the need to compromise between immediate strategic interests and long-term democratization efforts is necessary to eliminate accusations of hubris and hypocrisy so common since the Bush Administration‘s Freedom Agenda. President Obama has made steps in the right direction, but has yet to present a cohesive, transparent democracy promotion policy to the public.

### A2 Microgrids

#### Do plan w/ stim funds- solves link to politics

#### SMRs key, microgrids and renewables fail

Barton 2011 (Charles Barton, founder of the Nuclear Green Revolution blog with an MA in philosophy, April 1, 2011, “Future storm damage to the grid may carry unacceptable costs,” http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011\_04\_01\_archive.html)

Amory Lovins has long argued that the traditional grid is vulnerable to this sort of damage. Lovins proposed a paradigm shift from centralized to distributed generation and from fossil fuels and nuclear power to renewable based micro-generation. Critics have pointed to flaws in Lovins model. Renewable generation systems are unreliable and their output varies from locality to locality, as well as from day to day, and hour to hour. In order to bring greater stability and predictability to the grid, electrical engineers have proposed expanding the electrical transmission system with thousands of new miles of transmission cables to be added to bring electricity from high wind and high sunshine areas, to consumers. This would lead, if anything, to greater grid vulnerability to storm damage in a high renewable penetration situation. Thus Lovins renewables/distributed generation model breaks down in the face of renewables limitations. Renewables penetration, will increase the distance between electrical generation facilities and customer homes and businesses, increasing the grid vulnerable to large scale damage, rather than enhancing reliability. Unfortunately Lovins failed to note that the distributed generation model actually worked much better with small nuclear power plants than with renewable generated electricity. Small nuclear plants could be located much closer to customer's homes, decreasing the probability of storm damage to transmission lines. At the very worst, small NPPs would stop the slide toward increased grid expansion. Small reactors have been proposed as electrical sources for isolated communities that are too remote for grid hookups. If the cost of small reactors can be lowered sufficiently it might be possible for many and perhaps even most communities to unhook from the grid while maintaining a reliable electrical supply. It is likely that electrical power will play an even more central role in a post-carbon energy era. Increased electrical dependency requires increased electrical reliability, and grid vulnerabilities limit electrical reliability. Storm damage can disrupt electrical service for days and even weeks. In a future, electricity dependent economy, grid damage can actually impede storm recovery efforts, making large scale grid damage semi-self perpetuating. Such grid unreliability becomes a threat to public health and safety. Thus grid reliability will be a more pressing future issue, than it has been. It is clear that renewable energy sources will worsen grid reliability, Some renewable advocates have suggested that the so called "smart grid" will prevent grid outages. Yet the grid will never be smart enough to repair its own damaged power lines. In addition the "smart grid" will be venerable to hackers, and would be a handy target to statures. A smart grid would be an easy target for a Stuxnet type virus attack. Not only does the "smart grid" not solve the problem posed by grid vulnerability to storm damage, but efficiency, another energy approach thought to be a panacea for electrical supply problems would be equally useless. Thus, decentralized electrical generation through the use of small nuclear power plants offers real potential for increasing electrical reliability, but successful use of renewable electrical generation approaches may worsen rather than improved grid reliability.

**Microgrds and renewables exacerbate unreliability**

**BIESI 2011** (Brookings Institution Energy Security Initiative, The Hoover Institution Shultz-Stevenson Task Force on Energy Policy, October 2011, "Assessing the Role of Distributed Power Systems in the U.S. Power Sector", media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Distributed-Energy.pdf)

Microgrid¶ Generation technologies are central to discus- sions around distributed energy systems. Howev- er, controls, infrastructure and demand side man- agement are also an integral part of the broader discussion. The term ‘microgrid,’ is used to refer to a smaller version of a main or central electri- cal grid that much like its larger counterpart, consists of interconnected electrical loads and distributed energy generation resources that are typically controlled by a central control system. A microgrid may operate independently as its own self-contained entity, or may be interconnected with an adjoining central utility grid or neighbor- ing microgrid.¶ The concept of the microgrid is often associated with a power system in developing countries where the centrally managed grid is weak or in- adequate. However, **microgrid architectures are deployed in the United States** including in vari- ous communities **such as** university campuses, hospitals, industry and **military.** Fully 74 percent of the global microgrid market dollars were spent in North America in 2010.40¶ Although not a specific technology in itself, the notion of the microgrid is a system comprised of software, controls and hardware infrastruc- ture including sensors, inverters, switches and converters. The microgrid and its primary com- ponents form the platform that is necessary for the integration of distributed generation resourc- es with the local loads consuming the energy. The benefits of such architectures lie in the fact that they can be locally operated and controlled independent of a centrally managed utility. Such architecture enables distributed power systems, whether they operate on a stand-alone basis, or as an integrated component of a larger central grid.¶ 1.4 Functional Risks of DPS Technology¶ Despite the policy support and cost declines in **technology, DPS applications are constrained by several fundamental technical and functional factors. These factors give rise to risks associated with power quality, “dipatchability” and reliability.** Some of the most important technical risks of widespread DPS deployment and integration are listed below.¶ Power Quality¶ Some **DPS technologies rely on power electronic devices**, such as AC-to-DC or DC-to-AC convert- ers. **If such devices are not correctly set up, the integration of DPS power can result in a harmonic distortion and in operational difficulties to loads connected to the same distribution systems**.41¶ Reactive Power Coordination¶ **With the proper system configuration and net- work interface, DPS can bring relief to the power system by providing close proximity power sup- port at the distribution level. However**, some **renewable** generation **sources** such as wind can **worsen the reactive coordination problem. Wind generators have asynchronous induction generators designed for variable speed charac- teristics and**, therefore, **must rely on the network to which they are connected for reactive power support.42¶** Reliability and Reserve Margin¶ **Intermittent power generation** such as solar and wind **is non-dispatchable. It is thus necessary to maintain sufficient generation reserve margins in order to provide reliable power generation**. If there is a high level of distributed generation de- ployment, **reserve margin maintenance can be a problem.**

### Russia Econ DA

#### The Russian economy is resilient

Bruce Stokes. "Don't Ignore the Russian Bear." Council on Foreign Relations. 2008. http://www.cfr.org/publication/3225/dont\_ignore\_the\_russian\_bear.html

A little less than a year ago, August 17 to be precise, the post-Cold War Russian economic experiment imploded. The ruble collapsed and debt payments to foreigners were frozen. Wall Street lost billions of dollars. Long Term Capital Management, one of the world's biggest hedge funds, had to be taken over by its bankers. Once burned, international investors yanked their capital out of all emerging markets— from Latin America to East Asia— causing world interest rates to spike. The global economy teetered on the edge of depression. But, much to the surprise of most economic pundits, international markets quickly righted themselves. The Russian economy proved far more resilient than anticipated. And, in retrospect, the events of August, 1998 were little more than a very large bump in the road. The lessons of this "crisis that wasn't" are now clear: Russia is not too big to fail (the volume of its debts do not dictate special treatment by its creditors); the financial world can cope with such failure; and the Russian economy can bounce back without much overt help from the West. But the impending $4.5 billion loan to Russia by the International Monetary Fund— reflecting Washington's gratitude for Moscow's help in Kosovo, continued fear of Russian nuclear proliferation and concern about Russia's internal political stability— demonstrates that Russia still remains too important for the world to ignore. This contradiction— not too big to fail, but still too big to flounder— highlights the friction inherent when economic policy is used to further geo-political goals. Up until a year ago, the Clinton Administration argued that aid to Russia was needed, in part, to avoid global economic collapse. August, 1998 exposed that rationale as a charade. Now American support for assistance to Russia can only be justified for two reasons: to reinforce Russia's transition to a market economy or as ransom in Moscow's continued strategic blackmail of the West. Evidence to justify the former is dubious. Its time to own up to the latter. Last summer's fleeting economic fright reflected Russia's staggering economic collapse. The ruble fell by more than 70 per cent in a couple of weeks. The economy shrank by 4.3 per cent. Real wages fell 41 per cent. But the crisis was cathartic. "The shock accomplished what reform was intended to achieve," said Anders Aslund, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. The banking system now functions better. Barter is declining. Most important, there has been no reversion to central planning, government-directed lending, industrial subsidies or government reliance on simply printing money.

#### “Stabilization fund” guarantees no instability

DPA (Part of M&G Business) "Russia, an island of Stability Amid Turbulent Markets." Apr. 9, 2008. http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/business/features/article\_1398923.php/Russia\_an\_island\_of\_stability\_amid\_turbulent\_markets

Like a teenager at the wheel of his diamond encrusted Mercedes, Moscow feels invulnerable, set to swerve past the US housing slump and slam through the global credit crunch. And today's precious fuel prices have armed Russia's economic heavy foot. 'Nothing bad, nothing awful will happen,' Vladimir Bragin, an analyst at Trust Bank, said blithely. 'If Russian oil prices remain relatively high, there'll be no problem.' Russia's economy in blush is underpinned by plentiful commodities, strong growth spurred by a consumption and investment boom and a banking system that is largely insulated from the paucity of money that has threatened lenders in other markets. 'This is an unusual global slowdown in the sense that it hasn't hit Russia's main export commodities,' agreed Rory MacFarquhar, a managing director at Goldman Sachs, which 'very bullish' on commodities predicted last week that oil prices could spike as high as 175 dollars per barrel in the long-term. But neither is Russia's economy susceptible to collapsing as in 1998 from a sudden drop in oil prices, economists in the capital said. 'For Russia this is all gravy. This money is all going straight into government accounts,' said MacFarquhar. Now approaching the 10th anniversary of the financial crisis, the singe of cautiousness marking Russia's financial authorities after watching their nation's savings vaporize in 1998 has left Russia best positioned to weather through. The government has culled huge current account and budget surpluses from taxes on oil into the so-called state Stabilization Fund, representing 170 billion dollars taken out of the investment cycle to mitigate the relationship of world oil prices on Russia's growth. 'With most of this oil windfall is taxed away and stashed away now, the effect of oil prices is not as strong as seven years ago,' said Yaroslav Lissovolik, Deutsche Bank's chief economist in Russia. Addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin ebulliently proclaimed Russia 'an island of stability,' perhaps teasing other economic leaders caught out in the storm.

### 2AC Fiscal Cliff- Link Turn

#### No deal- ideological lines in the sand

Zurko 11/9 (Roz Zurko, Wall Street reacts to Obama and Boehner's 'lines in the sand', Examiner, http://www.examiner.com/article/wall-street-reacts-to-obama-and-boehner-s-lines-the-sand)

Boehner called on Obama to lead the efforts to avoid the fiscal cliff, but took the same stand against increasing the taxes for the wealthy. Obama later invited the congressional leaders to the White House to start in the negotiations in a deal to avoid the fiscal cliff. He remained adamant on his stand for wanting higher taxes for the wealthy. So there you have it, it doesn’t look as if a thing has changed. This also seems to be the mindset of Wall Street, nothing has changed and not a hint of a rescue is seen for the dreaded fiscal cliff.¶ Mohannad Aama, managing director of Beam Capitol Management LLC in New York said,¶ "Investors were disappointed. There was anticipation that there may be more willingness to compromise, but just like Boehner did earlier in the day, both camps stuck to their lines in the sand, so to speak."

#### No impact to fiscal cliff

Gradual slope

Policy mitigation

Reversibility

Stone 2012 (Chad Stone, PhD in Economics from Yale, Chief Economist at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities where he specializes in the economic analysis of budget and policy issues, acting executive director of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress in 2007 and before that staff director and chief economist for the Democratic staff of the committee from 2002 to 2006, chief economist for the Senate Budget Committee in 2001-02 and a senior economist and then chief economist at the President’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1996 to 2001, senior researcher at the Urban Institute and taught for several years at Swarthmore College, October 10, 2012, “It’s a Slope, Not a Cliff,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, http://www.offthechartsblog.org/its-a-slope-not-a-cliff/)

Will the bell toll on the economic recovery at midnight December 31st if policymakers allow the tax and spending changes required under current law to kick in — that is, if we go over the so-called “fiscal cliff”? We’ve said no, and a new analysis by Goldman Sachs (GS) economists Alec Phillips and Jan Hatzius reaches broadly similar conclusions.¶ Policymakers still would have some time in early 2013 to work out a responsible long-term budget deal that reduces deficits in a way that does not wreck the recovery.¶ If the scheduled tax and spending changes take effect, the economy will start down a slope that would likely be relatively modest at first, but then much steeper if 2013 unfolds without a budget deal. Thus, if policymakers strike a deal before the economy has gone very far down that slope, any harm to the recovery is likely to be much smaller than if there is no agreement and all the “fiscal cliff” measures stay in effect.¶ Here’s how GS sees it:¶ It is likely that if Congress were to fail to address this issue before the end of the year [2012], lawmakers would return in January and reach an agreement fairly quickly. The debt limit, which Congress must raise no later than early March according to our projections, might serve as a deadline for action on the fiscal cliff if public pressure hasn’t already forced an agreement. If, for example, an agreement were reached in January, we assume it would reinstate most policies retroactively, meaning that much of the effect would be reversed before the end of the quarter, reducing the overall economic effect.¶ Both sides of the political aisle have proposed extending President Bush’s “middle-class” tax cuts for another year. The sticking point is the upper-income Bush tax cuts. GS argues that it might be easier to reach agreement once all the tax cuts have expired, “since lawmakers could claim that setting tax rates and/or revenue levels higher than 2012 would nevertheless constitute a ‘tax cut’ compared with the policies that would be in effect in January 2013.”¶ GS goes on to argue that if policymakers appear likely to extend at least some of the tax cuts retroactively, the Treasury Department might have the flexibility to maintain tax withholding at 2012 levels for a while, which “would cushion the effect of a short lapse.”¶ Similarly, GS observes, government agencies might be able to phase in the automatic spending cuts (the “sequester”) that the Budget Control Act requires in 2013 if a budget deal appeared likely.¶ The fact that the economy will start down a slope in January, not plunge over a cliff, gives policymakers an opportunity to craft a responsible budget agreement in January or February if they can’t do it before then. If they seize that opportunity, the economy will be little the worse for wear as a result of the delay — and the budget outlook may be greatly improved.

#### Political capital theory is bankrupt

Dickinson2009 (Matthew Dickinson, professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power” May, google)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.

#### Here are 17 thumpers

Wasson 11/7 (Erick Wasson, “25 problems facing Obama, Congress,” The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/budget/266667-25-problems-now-facing-obama-congress)

A slew of thorny issues awaits President Obama and Congress in the lame-duck session, ranging from taxes to defense to Medicare. ¶ Obama’s victory increases the chances that the lame duck will be productive, but it remains to be seen if the president and leaders on Capitol Hill can break the gridlock that has gripped the 112th Congress. ¶ The following are 25 policy matters most likely to be addressed in the coming weeks. ¶ Expiring Bush-era tax rates¶ House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) quickly sought to define the terms of this debate, saying on election night that Obama’s victory is not a mandate to raise taxes. But Obama clearly has leverage, especially because the 2001 and 2003 tax reductions expire at the end of the year. Obama has vowed not to renew the tax reduction for families making more than $250,000 a year; the GOP wants all the reductions extended. Despite the rhetoric, a compromise at a $1 million threshold could be reached. Another possibility is extending the Bush rates temporarily in exchange for future tax revenue increases as a part of tax reform. ¶ Sequester¶ Under the terms of the August 2011 debt-ceiling deal, $109 billion in across-the-board spending cuts is set to hit in January. Defense would take a $55 billion hit. Congress will look to replace at least this first slice of $1 trillion in 10-year cuts with targeted cuts to mandatory spending and possibly tax increases. A “grand bargain” replacing all the cuts and tax increases in the fiscal cliff is probably not entirely feasible in the lame duck, but a framework for future action in 2013 could materialize. ¶ Hurricane Sandy supplemental spending bill¶ The damage from Sandy will still be big news when Congress returns next week. Forty-four members of the House signed a bipartisan letter urging leaders to be prepared to increase the federal disaster relief fund’s $7.1 billion budget. ¶ Alternative Minimum Tax patch¶ Unless Congress acts, millions of middle-class earners will come under the umbrella of the AMT for the current tax year. Indexing the AMT exemption for inflation retroactively would be a nightmare, so some form of AMT patch is highly likely in the lame-duck session.¶ Capital gains tax rate¶ After Dec. 31, the tax rate on investments held for more than one year will rise for middle-income and higher-income earners, from 15 percent to 20. Obama wants to preserve the rise for higher-income earners. Some Republicans want the rate dropped to zero to spur investment.¶ Medicare doc fix¶ Unless Congress acts, Medicare payments to doctors will be slashed by 27 percent in January. ¶ Omnibus appropriations bill¶ The six-month continuing resolution put the government on autopilot until March. If replacing the sequester involves discretionary cuts, there would be momentum to replace the continuing resolution with 12 detailed bills.¶ Postal reform¶ The beleaguered U.S. Postal Service this fall defaulted on $11 billion in retiree healthcare payments. The Senate and House have different approaches to revamping the USPS. ¶ Payroll tax cut extension¶ House Democrats, led by Budget Committee ranking member Chris Van Hollen (Md.), have suggested continuing the 2-percentage-point reduction in the payroll tax that was extended in February. Some liberals are suggesting that reviving the 2009 stimulus’s Making Work Pay tax credit is a better idea. ¶ Unemployment insurance extension¶ Under an agreement forged in February, extended federal benefits have been gradually curtailed and are set to expire for the long-term unemployed at year’s end. Expect the battle to, once again, be contentious, with some lawmakers reluctant to spend federal dollars despite a national employment rate that recently rose to 7.9 percent. ¶ Tax extenders¶ A package dealing with most of 73 targeted tax credits has passed the Senate Finance Committee. The $205 billion bill would patch the AMT and contains items like the research and development tax credit and a production tax credit for wind projects. ¶ Infrastructure bank¶ Sandy has exposed weaknesses in transportation and water infrastructure and could boost plans to fix crumbling roads, bridges, ports and tunnels. Obama incorporated a bipartisan proposal to create a national infrastructure bank in his stalled 2011 Jobs Act. It would take $10 billion in government seed money to identify worthy projects and seek out private financing to supplement government loan guarantees. ¶ Defense authorization¶ A defense authorization bill has passed for each of the last 50 years, and the Senate is unlikely to break that streak in the lame duck. The main issues have been Senate floor time and Majority Leader Harry Reid’s (D-Nev.) desire to avoid giving the GOP a chance to blame Obama for sequestration. The Senate Armed Services Committee passed a $631.4 billion bill with $4 billion less in funding than the House-passed bill. The House measure seeks to ban gay marriage on military bases. ¶ Farm bill¶ The Senate has passed a bill, but House GOP leaders have refused to act on a pending plan in the lower chamber. Liberals are opposed to food-stamp cuts in both bills, while conservatives want deeper cuts. The farm bill could get wrapped into a fiscal cliff deal replacing the sequester. ¶ Airline emissions¶ The European Union has enacted a climate-change plan whereby airlines servicing the continent will have to buy carbon credits. The Senate on Sept. 22 passed a bill aimed at shielding U.S. airlines from paying greenhouse-gas penalties. The House passed a similar version of the bill in 2011 and might be amenable to passing the Senate version. ¶ Online poker¶ Reid wants action in the lame duck on a bill legalizing online poker and online lottery sales. Companion legislation has been introduced in the House by Rep. Joe Barton (R-Texas). ¶ Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act¶ The Senate might consider the controversial FISA amendments bill in the lame duck. The legislation would reauthorize spying on foreign communications without a judicial warrant. The House has approved a five-year extension of the authority, which expires in January. ¶ Violence Against Women Act¶ VAWA became a major campaign-season talking point for Democrats, who claimed the GOP was waging a “war on women.” The House and Senate have passed different VAWA legislation, which seeks to extend funding to investigate and prosecute domestic violence. ¶ Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for Russia¶ Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) this summer with the backing of the United States. At this point, U.S. exporters cannot enjoy the lower tariffs Russia is granting other WTO members because the U.S. has not permanently removed longstanding conditions on trade with Russia stemming from the Soviet era. PNTR is heavily supported by the business community.¶ Benefits for same-sex partners of federal workers¶ Retiring Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) has pushed a bill that would provide retirement and health benefits to same-sex domestic partners of federal workers. Sen.-elect Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.) sponsored the House version. ¶ Online sales tax¶ Retail groups have been pushing hard for an online sales tax measure they say will level the playing field between brick-and-mortar stores and online retailers. Similar, but not identical, bipartisan measures in both the House and Senate would allow states to collect from out-of-state retailers. Some conservatives, such as Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), oppose it.¶ Cybersecurity¶ Senate Republicans blocked the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, sponsored by Sens. Lieberman and Susan Collins (R-Maine), in September, and a compromise has been elusive, given business opposition.¶ China currency¶ China currency played a big role in the presidential campaign, with Mitt Romney vowing to name China a currency manipulator on day one of his administration. The Senate passed a bill 63-35 last year hitting China with tariffs, but it has not been taken up by House GOP leaders. ¶ Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief extension¶ Under permanent tax law, mortgage debt that is forgiven by a bank, either through a principal reduction or a short sale, is taxed as income. But the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, passed in 2007 in an effort to boost the ailing housing market, allowed taxpayers to exempt that forgiveness from their tax bill. Now the law is set to expire, and industry groups and housing advocates are pushing to get it extended as part of any broad legislative package. ¶ Consumer Financial Protection Bureau fix¶ Obama’s win means that repealing Dodd-Frank is off the table. But the financial industry and both parties want to tweak part of the Wall Street reform law, which created the CFPB, that contains a technical oversight that could endanger vital information handed to the new regulator.

**Congress requested the plan**

Matthews 2010 (William Matthews, February 15, 2010, “The Nuclear Option,” Defense News, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100215/DEFFEAT01/2150310/The-Nuclear-Option)

The electric grids that the United States depends on for computers, communications gear and command centers are increasingly unreliable. They're strained by growing civilian demand, enfeebled by aging equipment and vulnerable to cyber and other attacks.¶ So the military is considering generating its own electricity, possibly with nuclear energy.¶ The push comes partially from the U.S. Congress, which last fall ordered the Defense Department to study the feasibility of building nuclear power plants on military installations. A report is due to lawmakers June 1.

#### Winners win- Second term depends on bold legislative moves

Ignatius 11/7 (David Ignatius, longtime writer and reporter, studied political theory at Harvard College and economics at Kings College, Cambridge, November 7, 2012, “A time for Obama to be bold,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-go-big/2012/11/07/dbf545f8-28fc-11e2-bab2-eda299503684\_story.html?hpid=z4)

Barack Obama will be getting advice by the boatload over the next few weeks, but the best guidance may be what emerges from Caro’s biography “The Passage of Power”: Think big. Find strategies and pressure points that can break the gridlock in Congress, which was as rigid in 1963 as it is today. Surprise your adversaries with bold moves and concessions that create new space on which to govern.¶ As I watched Tuesday’s triumph, it seemed obvious that Obama needs the policy equivalent of David Plouffe, his senior campaign adviser. Plouffe’s genius was to decide early on that the race depended on nine battleground states; if he could deliver those states by a relentless and sometimes ruthless assault, he would win the larger victory. He was like a general who concentrates his forces at the points of greatest vulnerability and then prevails through sheer force of will.¶ Obama’s performance as president has often lacked this decisive, strategic quality. The notes are there but not the policy “music.” In both foreign and domestic policy, the impression of Obama, after his blunderbuss, first-year battles on health care and the Israeli-Palestinian issue, has been of a careful president who reacts to events, waits for others to make the first moves and plays to avoid losing rather than to win.¶ Well, Mr. President, what the hell’s the presidency for?¶ A strategic second term would begin by identifying a list of necessary and achievable goals, and then pursuing them with the unyielding manipulative skill of a Lyndon Johnson. On the top of everybody’s list would be a budget deal. Everybody knows, more or less, what it will require: changes in Social Security and Medicare that slow the growth of entitlement spending; reform of the tax code that produces a fairer and simpler system that raises revenue without limiting growth.¶ A road map is there in the Simpson-Bowles deficit-reduction plan, and Obama administration officials have been thinking privately for months about how to tweak the plan so it’s better and fairer. Mitt Romney’s generous concession speech Tuesday night opened a possible door, and the president should follow up his statement that he will “look forward to sitting down with Governor Romney to talk about where we can work together to move this country forward.” The president and his new Treasury secretary (Jack Lew?) should take the next step and ask Romney to help close the budget deal the country needs.¶ In foreign policy, Obama will need to be equally strategic. What does he want to accomplish? My list: a deal with Iran that verifiably limits its nuclear program and avoids war; a deal in Afghanistan that averts civil war when U.S. forces leave in 2014; a deal for a political transition in Syria (a shorthand Syria summary would be to organize the opposition so that it’s strong enough to bargain, then help win a Nobel Peace Prize for Vladimir Putin). And, finally, a deal to create a Palestinian state so that Israel has secure borders and the Arab world can get on with the process of becoming modern and democratic.¶ All these primary foreign policy goals are “deals,” and it follows that the president needs a dealmaker as secretary of state. Who could do that, after Hillary Clinton leaves, probably at the end of January? John Kerry is an experienced man who thinks outside the box and is willing to take risks. Even if the president is said to have found him somewhat windy as the stand-in for Romney during debate preparation, Kerry has shown over the past four years a willingness to negotiate with adversaries, in secret, to achieve results.¶ A longtime Democratic adviser argues that Obama needs the “Bolten Plan,” as in Josh Bolten, the White House chief of staff who mobilized the machinery of government to get it moving in the same direction in George W. Bush’s second term. This will never be a happy model for Democrats, but it captures an important point: A successful second term is less about ideology than about results.¶ Think big. Take risks. Get it done. Maybe someone should slip a note in Obama’s desk drawer that asks: What would Lyndon Johnson have done to make it happen?

**2AC DOD Tradeoff DA**

**Cuts inevitable and no impact**

**Harrison 2012** (Todd Harrison, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Priorities, August 24, 2012, “ANALYSIS OF THE FY 2013 DEFENSE BUDGET AND SEQUESTRATION,” http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/)

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 defense budget currently being debated in Congress is a departure from previous budgets in several respects. It is the first budget submitted following the release of the Pentagon’s new strategic guidance, marking the beginning of a “pivot” from the wars of the past decade to the Asia-Pacific region. It is also the first budget request in more than a decade to propose a real decline in defense spending from the level currently enacted. Moreover, the prospect of sequestration hangs over the budget, threatening to cut some 10 percent of funding if Congress does not act to prevent it. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has argued that the budget request is a “complete package,” that “there is little room here for significant modification,” and that any further funding reductions, such as those called for by sequestration, would require the Department to fundamentally rethink its new strategy.1 Nevertheless, the FY 2013 request is **unlikely to survive unscathed** and the Department will likely be forced to revise its strategic guidance. For this reason, the specifics of this budget request **matter less than the general themes** it contains. The budget is likely to be modified substantially by the Congressional authorization and appropriations process, and the across-the-board cuts sequestration would impose—or some alternative to sequestration devised by Congress—would further disrupt the detailed plans contained in the budget. Instead of diving into the details of the budget request and the proposed changes in specific programs, this analysis focuses on the overall direction of the budget request, its alignment with the new strategic guidance, and the details of how sequestration would be implemented. It evaluates the impact sequestration would have on different types of accounts and notes the things sequestration would not affect. It also explores some of the major budgetary issues facing the Department even if sequestration is avoided.

**No link-**

**No upfront cost**

**DOE 2011** (“Funding Federal Energy and Water Projects,” July 2011, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/52085.pdf)

On-site renewable PPAs allow Federal agencies to fund on-site renewable energy projects with **no upfront capital costs** incurred. A developer installs a renewable energy system on agency property under an agreement that the agency will pur- chase the power generated by the system. The agency pays for the system through these power purchase payments over the life of the contract. After installation, the developer owns, operates, and maintains the system for the life of the contract. The PPA price is typically determined through a competitive procurement process.

**Only trades off with other energy projects**

**GAO 2012** (Government Accountability Office, April 2012, “RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT FINANCING:

Improved Guidance and Information Sharing Needed for DOD Project-Level Officials,” online)

Availability of funding. Some military service headquarters and installation officials said that, in recent years, they have preferred to use up-front appropriations to pay for renewable energy projects on installations since an increased amount of appropriated funding has been available for such projects through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Energy Conservation Investment Program, and centrally managed operation and maintenance funding from the military services. However, officials said that they expect they will need to seek alternative financing for renewable energy projects in the future due to likely reductions in the availability of up-front appropriated funding. Some officials noted that a drawback of each of the appropriated fund sources is that renewable energy projects must compete with other projects for funding and renewable energy projects are often a **lower priority** than other projects because of the relatively higher cost and lower savings generated from such projects. For example, officials at some installations said that they generally do not use installation-managed operation and maintenance funds for renewable energy projects because of competing demands for this funding for repairs and other maintenance of existing facilities on the installation. With regard to the Energy Conservation Investment Program, renewable energy projects must **compete against other renewable energy projects** as well as energy efficiency projects for limited funding and, according to officials, energy efficiency projects are often more cost-effective than renewable energy projects and receive higher priority for funding.

**DOD will get more money if needed**

**Masters 2012** (Jonathan Masters, quotes Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Defense Budget at the Crossroads,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/defense-budget-crossroads/p27318)

Projecting defense spending in an evolving security environment may also be more **aspirational** than practical. "While everybody talks about ten years, if the American economy recovers, if there's a new threat, if technology changes, **so does everything in the defense budget** (CNN)," says military expert Anthony Cordesman.

**FY13 budget as is undermines the pivot**

**Manyin 2012** (Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs at the CRS, March 28, 2012, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf)

The depth of the Obama Administration’s “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific region also may be called into question as time goes on. As yet, it does not appear that the Administration has translated its pronouncements into an across-the-government plan to implement the new elements of the strategy. The Administration’s budget request for FY2013 sends **ambiguous signals**. On the one hand, the proposed budget includes a 5% decrease for East Asia and Pacific (EAP) bilateral assistance programs below projected spending levels for FY2012. On the other hand, compared to some other aid regions, funding for EAP remains relatively stable. Overall assistance funding to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (which includes Afghanistan), for example, is to fall by 18%, according to the FY2013 budget request.25 Additionally, the prominence the Obama Administration has given to the initiative has undoubtedly raised the potential costs to the United States if it or successor administrations fail to follow through on public pledges. Chinese analysts have already expressed skepticism about the U.S. ability to follow through on the “pivot,” given U.S. economic difficulties and the continuing turmoil in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other areas.26 If such predictions come to pass, U.S. influence may fall farther and faster due to the Obama Administration’s high profile announcements.

**No impact to cuts- Even budget sequestration wouldn’t undermine regional presence**

**Singer 9/23** (Peter Singer, Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, September 23, 2012, “Sequestration and What it Might Mean for American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/09/23-sequestration-defense-singer)

The US may have global power and responsibilities, but in recent years, a strategic shift has occurred. China’s military has risen in conjunction with its driving economy, which has prompted a refocus on Asia and a “pivot” or “rebalance” in American grand strategy. Thus, while we explored in previous sections the drivers of sequestration and what it might do to the US defense budget in comparison to world military spending, that would miss a major part of the story. One should also put US military spending not just in a global context but regional one.¶ Within Asia, China is a dominant defense spender, both in its official budget and its more realistic overall unofficial budget. North Korea, which we’ll look at in more detail in the next part, equally has a disconnect between its official budget of $1 billion and the more likely estimates of $9 billion. [14]¶ However, here again, the numbers take on a far different interpretation when you include the true Asian superpower, the **U**nited **S**tates, in the context.¶ If sequestration were to occur, the US slice of the pie goes down, but is still a dominant slice, even more so if one includes its allies in the weighting.¶ Of course, the US has global responsibilities, and so these figures should not be taken as the end of the story. Akin to the German naval position versus the British prior to World War I, a rising regional power like China might present a larger threat than any straight comparison of their relative numbers. A global power like the British back then or the US today can be spread too thin, while the regional power’s resources are all focused (so the British during this period used variations on the “two power standard” as their guide to naval force size, ensuring a fleet larger than the two next powers combined). Of course, in turn, the global power can still bring these other resources to bear in regional scenarios whenever the situation grows important, and that regional power is also counterbalanced by the other allies within the region, who see its growth as a threat.¶ Military spending as compared to GDP shows similar weights. Other than North Korea, which has the dark combination of being a garrison state with a withered economy, the US percentages still rank high regardless of the scenario. Even in the worst scenario of sequestration, the US is still at 3.45% of GDP, a full point higher than China at 2.36% of its smaller but rapidly growing economy.

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### Drones

#### Their ev is backwards- selection bias- increased violence prompted the strikes, not the other way around

Johnston 2012 (Patrick B. Johnston, Associate Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, Anoop Sarbahi, post-doctoral researcher at Stanford, February 25, 2012, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf)

This research note has presented an analysis of the relationship between US drone strikes and militant violence in northwestern Pakistan. Initial analysis showed a positive correlation between drone strikes and militant violence. This correlation appears to be attributable to selection bias—as the war in northwestern Pakistan has intensified, the US has increasingly turned to direct action counterterrorism, primarily through drone strikes. After controlling for local factors and time trends, we found evidence of a negative correlation. But even though there is suggestive evidence that drones strikes have yielded counterterrorism dividends, caution should be exercised in inferring causality due to the selection bias inherent in the data.

#### Drones are no big deal- people actually effected support them bc they don’t want terrorist criminals running rampant in their communities

Yousefzai 2012 (Zmarak Yousefzai practices national security litigation in Washington, DC for an international law firm. He was born and raised in the tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, October 15, 2012, “Voice of a native son: Drones may be a necessary evil,” Foreign Policy, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/15/voice\_of\_a\_native\_son\_drones\_may\_be\_a\_necessary\_evil)

The biggest debate surrounding the Afghanistan-Pakistan region today concerns the U.S. drone program in Pakistan's tribal regions, which target the militants who terrorize and kill local residents, and who attack American soldiers inside Afghanistan. Ironically, the anti-war group CODEPINK -- members of which visited Pakistan last week to protest drone strikes -- along with much of the American left, the Pakistani establishment, and the Taliban are all on the same side in their opposition to drone strikes. While silent on the many more targeted killings of innocent civilians by Taliban militants in the tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pakistani establishment and the American left both loudly criticize U.S. drone strikes, albeit for different reasons. Pakistani officials cite Pakistan's sovereignty as their main justification for opposing drone strikes. But sovereignty is neither the actual reason for their anger, nor is it a legitimate argument against drone strikes. The actual reason is that the United States blames Pakistan for its failure to clear militants out of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. FATA serves as a base for militants and is therefore the target of drone strikes. In return, Pakistan uses anti-drone campaigns to stir up anti-Americanism through the media and insists on its national sovereignty over FATA. Pakistan's sovereignty claim itself is completely invalid. Pakistan does not now nor has it ever had a complete sovereign control -- as modern nation-states define the term -- over FATA. In fact, it is precisely Pakistan's lack of sovereign control over FATA that allows the militants, many of whom are not Pakistanis, to operate so openly there and invite drone strikes. And that is the best case scenario for Pakistan; the worst case, many believe, is that Pakistan houses and trains these militants in FATA. Indeed, we just saw a fitting example of Pakistan's lack of sovereignty over FATA last week. An anti-drone march to the FATA area of Waziristan on October 7 led by Pakistan's leading politician, Imran Khan, and accompanied by CODEPINK members, failed to reach Waziristan. The march was halted when the Pakistan security forces could not guarantee the safety of the participants. Moreover, there is at least some evidence that the drone attacks are taking place with Pakistan's consent. If the Pakistani government was seriously against drone strikes, it could take a number of actions against the United States, including blocking the NATO supply route that goes through Pakistan, the way it did in late 2011 when NATO forces mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at two military posts near the border with Afghanistan. For CODEPINK and the American far left, the opposition to drone strikes rests on the idea that drones kill innocent civilians. The recently published "Living Under Drones," a report based on 130 interviews with family members of drone strike victims, studied the negative impact of drone strikes on civilians. But the debate on the drones' effectiveness and its impact on civilians is far from settled. For example, a February 2012 investigation by the Associated Press, which interviewed people inside FATA, reported that civilian casualties from drones are far lower than Pakistan civil society figures, journalists, and party officials assert publicly. Another study, relying on open-source data on reported U.S. drone strikes and terrorist activity in FATA between March 2004 and 2010, also found a negative correlation between drone strikes and militant violence. The strikes have also killed high-level Taliban leaders, like Baddrudin Haqqani and Baitullah Mehsud, and key Al-Qaeda militants, like Abu Kasha Al-Iraqi and Saleh Al-Turki. The New America Foundation estimates that around 84% of the people killed in drone strikes from 2004 to the present were al-Qaeda or Taliban militants. The drone accuracy rose to an amazing 95% in 2010. It is perhaps for these reasons that polls show that the residents of FATA, who are the target of drones, are less opposed to drones than the rest of Pakistanis who are not the target of drones. FATA residents are eight times more supportive of drones than are the rest of Pakistanis. Moreover, a mere 48% of FATA residents believe that drones kill innocent civilians, compared to 89% of people in the rest of Pakistan. Surveys consistently find that FATA residents fear bomb blasts by Taliban and the Pakistani military more than they do drone strikes. According to the Community Appraisal and Motivation Program (CAMP), a Pakistan-based research group, when asked open-ended questions about their greatest fears, very few FATA residents ever mention drones. Even the Peshawar Declaration, a conference organized and attended by leaders of these tribal areas, showed strong support for drone strikes. That being said, there is little doubt that civilians have died in drone attacks. But that just raises the bigger question: is there a better alternative to drone strikes for counterterrorism in northwest Pakistan? To answer that question, we can look to the Swat Valley, just north of Waziristan, where 14-year-old Malala Yousafzai was shot in the head by Taliban militants last Tuesday for advocating for girls' education. Swat, like Waziristan, has been a stronghold of the Taliban. But unlike Waziristan, Swat has not seen any drone strikes. Instead, in Swat, the only available alternative approach was taken. For much of 2007 and 2008, the people of Swat were left at the mercy of the Taliban, who operated with impunity and killed, tortured, wounded, and displaced countless people. Then, after being pressured by the United States, the Pakistani military entered Swat and conducted an operation to root out the Taliban. The military operation resulted in thousands of deaths, many more wounded, and over one million people displaced, with a quarter million refugees crammed into mere 24 camps -- the worst crisis since Rwanda in 1994, according to the United Nations. The operation also resulted in the destruction of hundreds of schools and egregious human rights violations by the Pakistani military - some of which I witnessed personally. By comparison, there are far fewer cases of displacement, civilian deaths, and other destruction in Waziristan where drone strikes are used. Nevertheless, by yet another comparison of hypocrisy, those who are loudest about casualties from U.S. drone strikes have rarely protested the far higher numbers of civilian casualties as a result of Pakistan Army operations or Taliban violence in the Swat Valley and FATA. Silenced in this double standard are the varying motives of different parties as well as the voice of the Pashtun people in these tribal areas. At least one voice -- that of this native Pashtun -- is speaking out to say that there are serious downsides to these drone strikes, but they may be a necessary evil and the lone option to combat those who are responsible for the severe suffering of our people - like Malala Yousafzai.

### A2 Solvency

#### Plans political pressure solves

Bradford 2009 (Peter A. Bradford, former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and former chair of the Maine and New York utility commissions, March 24, 2009, testimony before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, Hearing on “Three Mile Island: Thirty Years of Lessons Learned,” http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-energy/issues/bradford\_tmi\_testimony.pdf)

Finally, a word about the lessons of Three Mile Island for Congressional Oversight. If the message that the NRC gets from the Congressional oversight committees is that what’s wanted is strong commission focus on expedited licensing of new reactors and deemphasized enforcement, that message will have an effect over time. Senator Pete Domenici asserted in his 1998 book that he singled-handedly changed NRCs priorities in a 1998 meeting with the NRC chair in which he threatened to cut the agency’s budget by one-third if the NRC did not modify its “adversarial attitude” toward the industry.

#### Squo solves export rules

Domenici and Miller 2012 (Senator Pete Domenici, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow, and Dr. Warren F. “Pete” Miller, Co-chair, Bipartisan Policy Center Nuclear Initiative¶ And Former Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, July 2012, “Maintaining U.S.¶ Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets,” http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Leadership%20in%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Markets.pdf)

In an attempt to ameliorate current competitive disadvantages, the Obama administration recently created a new position within the National Security Council to coordinate civilian nuclear policy. We support the creation of this new position to improve coordination of executive branch policy for nuclear energy policy and international affairs. We believe continued efforts to improve coordination between government and industry stakeholders and to more efficiently apply federal export regulations will allow U.S. companies to compete more effectively in the global nuclear marketplace.

### Thumpers

#### Cybersecurity = priority and controversial

Chokshi 11/6 Niraj Chokshi and Ben Terris, “A Full Plate Awaits Congress In Lame Duck National Journal Daily,” National Journal, lexis

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid says he plans to bring up a sweeping cybersecurity bill during the lame duck that Republicans filibustered last summer, even though the path to passage remains unclear. The bill's top sponsor, Senate Homeland Security Chairman Joe Lieberman, ID-Conn., says he is looking forward to revisiting the issue. But Lieberman and Republican critics are doubtful about its prospects.

#### Farm bill first

Smith 11/8 (Rep Adrian Smith, R-Neb, November 8, 2012, “Opinion column: Priorities for the Lame Duck Session,” Business Farmer, http://www.thebusinessfarmer.com/v2\_news\_articles.php?heading=0&page=73&story\_id=2147)

When Congress returns to Washington after the election, we have a long list of items to address before the end of the year. One of the biggest priorities, especially for Nebraska producers, will be passing a responsible Farm Bill to prevent a lapse in policy. Congress also must act to prevent the largest tax hike in American history before the current rates expire on Jan. 1, 2013.

### Winners Win

#### Bold moves boost capital

Green, 2010 (David Michael Green, professor of political science at Hofstra University, “The Do-Nothing 44th President” June 11, google)

Moreover, there is a continuously evolving and reciprocal relationship between presidential boldness and achievement. In the same way that nothing breeds success like success, nothing sets the president up for achieving his or her next goal better than succeeding dramatically on the last go around. This is absolutely a matter of perception, and you can see it best in the way that Congress and especially the Washington press corps fawn over bold and intimidating presidents like Reagan and George W. Bush. The political teams surrounding these presidents understood the psychology of power all too well. They knew that by simultaneously creating a steamroller effect and feigning a clubby atmosphere for Congress and the press, they could leave such hapless hangers-on with only one remaining way to pretend to preserve their dignities. By jumping on board the freight train, they could be given the illusion of being next to power, of being part of the winning team. And so, with virtually the sole exception of the now retired Helen Thomas, this is precisely what they did.

#### PC replenishes quickly

Mitchell 2009 (Lincoln Mitchell, Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics, Columbia University, “Time for Obama to Start Spending Political Capital” June 18, google)

Throughout his presidential campaign, but more notably, during his presidency, President Obama has shown himself to have an impressive ability to accumulate political capital. During his tenure in the White House, Obama has done this by reaching out to a range of constituencies, moderating some of his programs, pursuing middle of the road approaches on key foreign policy questions and, not insignificantly, working to ensure that his approval rating remains quite high. Political capital is not, however, like money, it cannot be saved up interminably while its owner waits for the right moment to spend it. Political capital has a shelf life, and often not a very long one. If it is not used relatively quickly, it dissipates and becomes useless to its owner. This is the moment in which Obama, who has spent the first few months of his presidency diligently accumulating political capital, now finds himself. The next few months will be a key time for Obama. If Obama does not spend this political capital during the next months, it will likely be gone by the New Year anyway. Much of what President Obama has done in his first six months or so in office has been designed to build political capital, interestingly he has sought to build this capital from both domestic and foreign sources. He has done this by traveling extensively, reintroducing to America to foreign audiences and by a governance style that has very cleverly succeeded in pushing his political opponents to the fringes. This tactic was displayed during the effort to pass the stimulus package as Republican opposition was relegated to a loud and annoying, but largely irrelevant, distraction. Building political capital was, or should have been, a major goal of Obama's recent speech in Cairo as well. Significantly, Obama has yet to spend any of his political capital by meaningfully taking on any powerful interests. He declined to take Wall Street on regarding the financial crisis, has prepared to, but not yet fully, challenged the power of the AMA or the insurance companies, nor has he really confronted any important Democratic Party groups such as organized labor. This strategy, however, will not be fruitful for much longer. There are now some very clear issues where Obama should be spending political capital. The most obvious of these is health care. The battle for health care reform will be a major defining issue, not just for the Obama presidency, but for American society over the next decades. It is imperative that Obama push for the best and most comprehensive health care reform possible. This will likely mean not just a bruising legislative battle, but one that will pit powerful interests, not just angry Republican ideologues, against the President. The legislative struggle will also pull many Democrats between the President and powerful interest groups. Obama must make it clear that there will be an enormous political cost which Democrats who vote against the bill will have to pay. Before any bill is voted upon, however, is perhaps an even more critical time as pressure from insurance groups, business groups and doctors organizations will be brought to bear both on congress, but also on the administration as it works with congress to craft the legislation. This is not the time when the administration must focus on making friends and being liked, but on standing their ground and getting a strong and inclusive health care reform bill. Obama will have to take a similar approach to any other major domestic legislation as well. This is, of course, the way the presidency has worked for decades. Obama is in an unusual situation because a similar dynamic is at work at the international level. A major part of Obama's first six months in office have involved pursuing a foreign policy that implicitly has sought to rebuild both the image of the US abroad, but also American political capital. It is less clear how Obama can use this capital, but now is the time to use it. A cynical interpretation of the choice facing Obama is that he can remain popular or he can have legislative and other policy accomplishments, but this interpretation would be wrong. By early 2010, Obama, and his party will, fairly or not, be increasingly judged by what they have accomplished in office, not by how deftly they have handled political challenges. Therefore, the only way he can remain popular and get new political capital is through converting his current political capital into concrete legislative accomplishments. Health care will be the first and very likely most important, test.